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Presidential Predictions of Supreme Court 
Justices' Behavior 
ROGER HANDBERG 
University of Central Fwrida 
With the retirement of Justice Douglas, President Ford was confronted 
with the dilemma of choice. Amid speculation over whether a female 
would be appointed to the Court, the President had to bear in mind the 
necessity of choosing a person who would hold policy views compatible 
with those of the President. Obviously, presidents have in their Supreme 
Court appointments the opportunity to affect future policy choices long 
after their administration has ended. Justice Douglas' retiremen t graphi-
cally demonstrated this fact since his tenure covered thirty six years-
thirty of those since the end of President Roosevelt's administr ation. 
Therefore, the choice is both more important and more difficult than 
other presidential appointments. The importance lies with th e Court 's 
ability to veto policies but even more importantly to shape the terms of 
the political debate. The difficulty exists in that you are pro jecting into 
an unknown future with an appointee you can not :fire if the results are 
contrary to your expectations. 1 
Henry Abraham has overviewed the entire historical pr ocess in his 
work Justices and Presidents with the explicit purpose of evaluating 
whether particular justices met the expectations of the appointing presi-
dent. 2 The record was found to be generally mixed primarily because of 
other factors such as friendship, lobbying campaigns, political expedi-
ency, and presidential inattention diluted the concern with policy views 
( at least explicit concern). One difficulty in evaluating judicial perfor-
mance though is that the evidence tends to be relatively impressionistic.8 
An alternative approach that exists for evaluating relative judici al be-
havior is presented by the materials in Schubert's The Judicial Mind Re-
visited.4 As a result of this analysis of voting behavior, a series of ideo-
1 Robert Scigliano has an excellent discussion of the process and its inheren t diffi-
culties. See The Supreme Court and the Presidency (New York: The Free Press, 
1971), Ch. 4 and 5. For lower federal courts, see Harold W. Chase, Federal Judges: 
The Appointing Process ( Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1972) . 
2 Henry J. Abraham, Justices and Presidents (New York: Penguin Books, Inc., 
1975), Ch. 3. 
3 Dennis Thompson, "The Kennedy Court: Left and Right of Center," 26 West-
ern Political, Quarterly ( 1973), 263-279. 
4 Glendon Schubert, The Judicial Mind Revisited (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 197 4). 
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1 gical types have been generated within which each justice is placed 0 
on that individual's performance upon the Court. The empirical types 
~cientilied break the Justices down into two broad groupings of liberals 
~d conservatives wi~ several subsets within each grouping. The place-
ments were extended mto the Burger Court although the data base was 
less complete. 11 Table 1 presents the placements as abstracted from The 
Judicial Mind Revisited. 
TABLE I. Scale Vector Types 0 
Modern Modern 
Ecolib Lib Polib Econs Cons Peons 
Black Brennan Frankfurter Burton Clark 
Douglas Fortas Jackson Harlan Minton 
Murphy Goldberg Stewart Whittaker Reed 
Rutledge Marshall Powell Burger Vinson 
Warren Rehnquist White 
Blackmun 
0 Material abstracted from Table 5.4, The Judicial Mind Revisited, p. 86-87. 
ECOLIB-economic liberalism 
MODERN LIB-modem liberalism 
POLIB--political liberalism 
ECONS-economic conservatism 
MODERN CONS-modem conservatism 
PCONS-political conservatism 
The question then becomes one of determining what expectations the 
president had when appointing the particular justice. The difficulty which 
becomes readily apparent is that the evidence is so sketchy and oft self-
serving that one is left at a loss as to what the "real" motivation was in 
a particular instance. 6 Therefore, the level of analysis here shifts from 
the particular to the general: what was the general domestic policy ori-
entation of the appointing president: i.e. liberal or conservative. Analy-
sis at this level obviously ignores certain affective elements in the ap-
pointment process but those can be conceptualized as explanations for 
failure to predict judicial performance successfully. Based on this pro-
cedure, the appointing presidential administrations were classified gener-
ally as either liberal (Roosevelt, Truman, Kennedy, and Johnson) or 
conservative (Eisenhower and Nixon). Table 2 presents a breakdown of 
appointments by administration. 
11 Ibid., 88-89. 
6 David J. Danelski, A Supreme Court Justice Is Appointed (New York: Ran-
dom House, 1964), Ch. 6-8. 
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TABLE 2. Justice Ideology 
Administration: Liberal 
Roosevelt . . . . . . . . 4 Black, Douglas, 
Murphy, Rutledge 
Truman ......... 0 
Eisenhower ...... 2 Warren , Brennan 
Kennedy . . . . . . . . 1 Goldberg 
Johnson . . . . . . . . . 2 Fortas, Marshall 
Nixon . . 0 
9 
Conservative 
3 Frankfurter, Jackson, 
Reed 
4 Burton, Vinson, 
Clark , Minton 




4 Burger, Blaclanun, 
Powell, Rehnquis t 
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What is clear is that the liberal presidents have had the greatest diffi-
culty in successfully predicting judicial performance ( 8 of 15 unsucce ss-
ful predictions) in terms of the appointee's liberalism/ conservatism. The 
two conservative presidents were much more successful ( 7 / 9 successful 
predictions). The two unsuccessful predictions by President Eisenhowe r 
occurred for somewhat similar reasons: i.e. political expediency. Chief 
Justice Warren was an apparent implicit political payoff for past party 
support while Justice Brennan's appointment was linked to presidenti al 
electoral calculations. Brennan was selected during the 1956 presiden tial 
campaign in an attempt to solidify Eastern Catholic support for Eisen-
hower. 7 
The failure of the liberal presidents to successfully predict is prim arily 
a function of friendship and historical change. Both Kennedy and espe-
cially Truman selected individuals on the basis of personal friends hip 
ties-a factor which in effect negated pure policy or ideological consid-
erations. Franklin Roosevelt's apparent inability to select congruent ap-
pointees is a function of the changed environment within which the 
appointees found themselves after the New Deal was constitutiona lly 
triumphant. Justice Jackson for example underwent a dramatic change 
in behavior after his experiences at the Nuremberg Trials. 8 Justices Reed 
and Frankfurter were ardent New Dealers initially but by 1946 ( when 
Schubert's analysis begins) had shifted to the more moderate and con-
7 Abraham, 236-237 and 245-246. 
8 Glendon Schubert, "Jackson's Judicial Philosophy: An Exploration in Value 
Analysis," 59 American Political Science Review ( 1965) 940-963. 
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ervative positions which characterized both until retirement. 9 Both were 
~ effect overtaken by events. President Truman's apparent failure to se-
lect apparent liberals is in part an artifact of the categories given the 
dichotomy that existed between the administration's liberal social-eco-
nomic programs and its hardline repressive position on subversives. J us-
tice Clark represents the best example of the dichotomy in his relative 
economic liberalism with a strong position in favor of government au-
thority to repress dissidents and punish criminals. 
The general thrust of this short note is that presidential predictions of 
supreme court appointees' future behavior is very accurate over the short 
run. One must remember that the individuals selected normally have had 
extensive and varied professional careers which usually establish a clear 
ideological pattern. Inability to predict is a function of other extraneous 
( though important) variables entering the selection process such as 
friendship ties or political expediency. Where the president is not di-
verted by such considerations-the predictions are very successful. When 
you consider the appointments within the first five years-there were no 
wrong predictions except for when the other variables intervened. In 
fact, the most successful ( and obvious) examples of prediction are Presi-
dent Eisenhower after the 1956 election and President Nixon in his an-
nounced campaign to restructure the Court. 10 Unfortunately for the presi-
dents, politics and friends exist so that ideological proclivities are an 
important consideration but need not be the dominant one. 
9 This shift was documented earlier by C. Herman Pritchett in The Roosevelt 
Court as he traced the shift of Frankfurter especially but also Reed and Jackson to 
more conservative position on the Court relative to the other Roosevelt appointees. 
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948), Ch. 9 and 10. 
10 Abraham, Ch. 1. 
